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FLORIDA STATE UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW
Constitutional Law-SEARCH AND SEIZURE-SCHOOL OFFICIALS' Au-
THORITY To SEARCH STUDENTS Is AUGMENTED BY THE In Loco Parentis
DOCTRINE-Nelson v. State, 319 So. 2d 154 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1975).
On May 29, 1973, while looking for another student, the Dean of
Boys and a teacher at Seminole High School observed defendant
Nelson, an eighteen-year-old student,1 and a friend smoking on school
grounds during school hours. The two men became suspicious, and as
they approached the students, the teacher detected the odor of mari-
juana.2 The students were taken to the Dean's office and told that
unless they emptied their pockets the Dean would summon school
security. The defendant complied, producing a corncob pipe and some
marijuana. He was subsequently charged with violation of the Florida
Comprehensive Drug Abuse Law.8
The defense filed a pretrial motion to suppress the evidence, on
the grounds that the search was unreasonable under the fourth amend-
ment. When the motion was denied, the defendant pleaded nolo con-
tendere, reserving the right to appeal.4 He was adjudicated guilty and
placed on three years' probation. 5
The Second District Court of Appeal affirmed the trial court's
denial of the motion to suppress,' on the argument that school officials
1. Letter from John Brook, Nelson's counsel, to Randall Reder (Jan. 20, 1977).
Seminole High School is located in Clearwater, Florida.
2. Nelson v. State, 319 So. 2d 154, 155 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1975).
3. 319 So. 2d at 155. The defendant was charged with possession of drug para-
phernalia, in violation of FLA. STAT. § 893.13 (1975), which provides in relevant part:
"(3)(a) It is unlawful for any person: . . . 4. To possess, have under his control, or
deliver any device, contrivance, instrument, or paraphernalia with the intent that said
device, contrivance, instrument, or paraphernalia be used for unlawfully administering
any controlled substance."
4. 319 So. 2d at 155. The Florida Supreme Court has held that a defendant may
plead nolo contendere conditioned on reservation for appellate review, but the question
to be reserved must be one of law. State v. Ashby, 245 So. 2d 225 (Fla. 1971); Valdes v.
State, 323 So. 2d 690 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1975); Beverly v. State, 322 So. 2d 597 (Fla.
1st Dist. Ct. App. 1975); Cameron v. State, 291 So. 2d 222 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1974).
5. 519 So. 2d at 155-56.
6. Id. at 156. The defendant also attacked the lower court's ruling which excluded
the testimony of the defendant's expert witnesses. The witnesses would have attempted
to show that Cannabis Sativa L., as defined under Florida law, was not inclusive of all
forms of Cannabis, in particular that which the defendant possessed at the time of his
arrest. The Nelson court summarily rejected the argument that the statute, by specifying
only Cannabis Sativa L. as the substance prohibited, failed to give notice that all types
of marijuana were prohibited. Id. The court cited United States v. Rothberg, 351 F.
Supp. 1115 (E.D.N.Y. 1972), aff'd 480 F.2d 534 (2d Cir. 1973); United States v. Henley,
502 F.2d 585 (5th Cir. 1974); United States v. Gaines, 489 F.2d 690 (5th Cir. 1974). In
Rothberg, the district court held that Cannabis Sativa L., as the term was used by
legislators and botanists in 1937, included all types of marijuana and that the statute
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stand in loco parentis to students. The court determined that such a
relationship justifies the application of a "reasonable suspicion"
standard (a standard lower than probable cause) in determining the
reasonableness of the search under the fourth amendment. Since the
court found that the school officials had a "reasonable suspicion" that
a crime was being committed, the search was lawful and the evidence
was properly admitted.7 Thus Nelson v. State became the first Florida
case to use the in loco parentis doctrine to set the parameters on search-
ing students for criminal evidence.
With its talismanic invocation of the in loco parentis doctrine, the
court sidestepped a careful consideration of issues usually pertinent
to search and seizure challenges. This comment will examine and
explain the fallacy of the court's reliance upon the in loco parentis
doctrine. It will suggest an analysis of school search cases which is
more in conformity with existing search and seizure law.
The issue on appeal in Nelson was the admissibility in a criminal
trial of evidence taken from a student by a school official. Generally,
evidence obtained by government agents in violation of the fourth
amendment is excluded.8 Thus a successful challenge under the ex-
was intended to cover all types. 351 F. Supp. at 1118. Henley and Gaines cited Rothberg
as authority for similar holdings.
7. 319 So. 2d at 156. Acting Chief Judge McNulty concurred in the result only.
8. The exclusionary rule developed as a means of effectuating fourth amendment
guarantees. By excluding evidence seized in violation of constitutional rights, courts
hope to deter such violations and "'compel respect for the constitutional guaranty.'"
Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 656 (1961), quoting Elkins v. United States, 364 U.S. 206,
217 (1960). Originally the rule, first enunciated by the United States Supreme Court in
Weeks v. United States, 232 U.S. 383 (1914), only applied to evidence obtained by federal
agents. 232 U.S. at 398. Later it was extended to evidence in federal criminal prosecu-
tions which had been obtained illegally by state law enforcement officers. Elkins v.
United States, 364 U.S. at 223. In Mapp, the Supreme Court held that the rule was
applicable to state criminal prosecutions through the fourteenth amendment. 367 U.S.
at 657.
FLA. CONsT. art. 1, § 12 provides:
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers and effects
against unreasonable searches and seizures, and against the unreasonable inter-
ception of private communications by any means, shall not be violated. No
warrant shall be issued except upon probable cause, supported by affidavit,
particularly describing the place or places to be searched, the person or persons,
thing or things to be seized, the communication to be intercepted, and the
nature of the evidence to be obtained. Articles or information obtained in viola-
tion of this right shall not be admissible in evidence.
The final sentence of § 12 was not added until the 1968 revision of the Florida Constitu-
tion; prior to 1968, however, Florida courts had read it into the state constitution.
See, e.g., Sing v. Wainwright, 148 So. 2d 19 (Fla. 1962); Chacon v. State, 102 So. 2d
578 (Fla. 1958); Thurman v. State, 156 So. 484 (Fla. 1934). But the exclusionary pro.
vision conflicts with another policy consideration: courts should have access to all the
available evidence. The final result of the rule's application is that the. criminal goes
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clusionary rule must show both government action (direct or a sufficient
nexus therewith)" and an unreasonable search and seizure. 10 The
Nelson court faced two issues in deciding the applicability of the
exclusionary rule: first, whether the fourth amendment applies to
school officials (government action), and second, whether the search
was reasonable.
A close reading of the Nelson opinion yields the conclusion that
the court begged the question of fourth amendment applicability by
virtue of government action. The court's attempt to justify the
reasonableness of the search suggests that they implicitly recognized
a governmental nexus." But the evidence would have been admissible
had the court found school officials to be private citizens. 2 Thus, even
if the court had drawn the conclusion that school officials were not
government agents, the end result might still have been the same.' 3
free because of the constable's blunder. See, e.g., Irvine v. California, 347 U.S. 128 (1954);
People v. Defore, 150 N.E. 585 (N.Y. 1926) (Cardozo, J.). There is considerable debate
whether the rule serves its function. Many commentators, in light of some empirical
studies, believe that deterrence is not being accomplished and suggest other alternatives.
See, e.g., Horowitz, Excluding the Exclusionary Rule-Can There Be an Effective Alter-
native? L.A.B. BULL. 91 (1972); Oaks, Studying the Exclusionary Rule in Search and
Seizure, 37 U. CH. L. REV. 665 (1970); Roche, A Viable Substitute for the Exclusionary
Rule: A Civil Rights Appeal Board, 30 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 223 (1973); Spiotta, Search
and Seizure: An Empirical Study of the Exclusionary Rule and Its Alternatives, 2 J.
LEGAL STUD. 243 (1973); Wright, Must the Criminal Go Free If the Constable Blunders?,
50 TEx. L. REV. 736 (1972).
9. Lustig v. United States, 338 U.S. 74, 79 (1948); United States v. Clegg, 509 F.2d
605, 609 (5th Cir. 1975); United States v. Mekjian, 505 F.2d 1320, 1327-28 (5th Cir.
1975); State v. Birdwell, 492 P.2d 249 (Wash. 1972).
10. Camara v. Municipal Ct., 387 U.S. 523 (1967).
11. 319 So. 2d at 156.
12. Burdeau v. McDowell, 256 U.S. 465 (1921):
The Fourth Amendment gives protection against unlawful searches and
seizures, and . . . its protection applies to governmental action. Its origin and
history clearly show that it was intended as a restraint upon the activities of
sovereign authority, and was not intended to be a limitation upon other than
governmental agencies.
Id. at 475.
For Florida cases applying this principle, see Sheff v. State, 329 So. 2d 270 (Fla.
1976) (maid found drugs in motel room); Bernovich v. State, 272 So. 2d 505 (Fla. 1973)
(evidence found by father-in-law); McDaniel v. State, 301 So. 2d 141 (Fla. 1st Dist.
Ct. App. 1974) (defendant's brother broke into house); State v. Bookout, 281 So. 2d 215
(Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1973) (airline employee searched unlocked suitcase to ascertain
owner). But see State v. Williams, 297 So. 2d 52 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1974) (uniformed
policeman hired to work on off-duty hours acted as officer of the city).
13. Some jurisdictions hold that school officials are not government agents. E.g.,
In re Donaldson, 75 Cal. Rptr. 220, 222 (Ct. App. 1969) ("We find the vice
principal of the high school not to be a governmental official within the meaning of
the Fourth Amendment so as to bring into play its prohibition against unreasonable
searches and seizures.'); Commonwealth v. Dingfelt, 323 A.2d 145, 147 (Pa. Super. Ct.
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The Nelson court was unable to find Florida precedent for deter-
mining the reasonableness of the search. Instead, it relied heavily on
People v. Jackson,1 4 a New York appellate decision which was among
the first cases to define a special standard for school searches. The
Jackson court held that a school official, though acting in the capacity
of a government agent, need not meet the probable cause standard
to satisfy fourth amendment requirements.11 Instead, the school
official need only have "reasonable grounds for suspecting that some-
thing unlawful was being committed." 16
The Jackson court based its less stringent "reasonable suspicion"
standard on public necessity, noting that New York City high schools
were threatened with "[r]ampant crime and drug abuse. ' ' 1 7 School
officials, according to the court, have the duty to protect students
from these harmful activities because of their "distinct relationship"-
standing in loco parentis.'5 The court asserted that the doctrine of in
loco parentis "is imbedded in the common law." 19 Since the doctrine
preceded the adoption of the Constitution, the court reasoned by exten-
sion that the fourth amendment should not handicap school officials in
carrying out the duties incumbent upon being in loco parentis.2
Accordingly, school officials are required to search for drugs, relieved
1974) ("[s]chool officials are not law officers of the government ....... ); Mercer v.
State, 450 S.W.2d 715, 717 (Tex. Civ. App. 1970) ("The principal in dealing with
appellant acted in loco parentis, not for an arm of the government."). See also State v.
Young, 216 S.E.2d 586 (Ga. 1975); Note, The Fourth Amendment and High School
Students, 6 WILLAMErrE L.J. 567 (1970).
Other jurisdictions hold that school officials are government agents but that the
fourth amendment requirements are less stringent. E.g., State v. Baccino, 282 A.2d 869,
872 (Del. Super. Ct. 1971) ("Thus I conclude that the doctrine of loco parentis . . .
must be balanced against the students' Fourth Amendment rights."); People v. Ward,
233 N.W.2d 180, 183 (Mich. Ct. App. 1975) ("[W]e adopt a 'reasonable suspicion'
standard."); In re G.C., 296 A.2d 102, 107 (N.J. Juv. Dom. Rel. Ct. 1972) ("I hold . . .
that the public school principal, acting as a governmental officer and under the in loco
parentis authority, made a reasonable search and seizure."); Doe v. State, 540 P.2d 827,
832 (N.M. Ct. App. 1975) ("[W]e adopt the standard that school officials may conduct
a search of a student's person if they have a reasonable suspicion that a crime is being
or has been committed."); People v. Jackson, 319 N.Y.S.2d 731 (App. Term 1971).
Two cases have held that school officials are government agents subject to the probable
cause requirements of the fourth amendment notwithstanding the in loco parentis
doctrine. State v. Mora, 307 So. 2d 317 (La. 1975), vacated on other grounds, 423 U.S.
809 (1976); State v. Walker, 528 P.2d 113 (Ore. App. 1974).
14. 319 N.Y.S.2d 731 (App. Term 1971).
15. Id. at 736. See also State v. McKinnon, 558 P.2d 781, 784 (Wash. 1977).
16. 319 N.Y.S.2d at 736.
17. Id.
18. Id. at 733.
19. Id. at 734.
20. id. at 735-36.
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of the stringent probable cause standard. 21 The search merely must
not be arbitrary.
22
The Nelson court adopted the New York court's rationale. Quoting
Jackson, the court stated: "The in loco parentis doctrine is so com-
pelling in light of public necessity and as a social concept antedating
the Fourth Amendment, that any action, including a search, taken
thereunder upon reasonable suspicion should be accepted as necessary
and reasonable. '23 The Nelson court further stated that the reasonable
suspicion standard would adequately safeguard students' constitutional
right to be protected from unlawful search and seizure.2
In reaching their decisions, the Nelson and Jackson courts mis-
applied the in loco parentis concept as it existed in common law. The
in loco parentis doctrine was originally based on two premises: (1) the
parent had specifically delegated his authority to the teacher, and
(2) the authority so delegated pertained only to restraint and correc-
tion.2 5 By the nineteenth century, the doctrine was firmly established
and was applied even though parents no longer specifically delegated
their authority.26 Gradually, the doctrine was expanded to validate
regulations enacted to protect student morals, welfare, and safety. 27 The
teacher, however, did not completely possess a parent's authority.2S
21. Id. at 736.
22. Id.
23. 319 So. 2d at 156, quoting 319 N.Y.S.2d at 736.
24. 319 So. 2d at 156.
25. These requirements were established at common law and mentioned by Black-
stone.
[The parent] may also delegate part of his parental authority, during his life, to
the tutor or schoolmaster of his child; who is then in loco parentis, and has such
a portion of the power of the parent committed to his charge, viz. that of re-
straint and correction, as may be necessary to answer the purposes for which he
is employed.
1 W. BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *453. See E. BOLMEIER, LEGALITY OF STUDENT DISCIPLINARY
PRACTICES 9 (1976).
26. For a broad historical analysis of the in loco parentis doctrine, see Mawdsley,
In Loco Parentis: A Balancing of Interest, 61 ILL. B.J. 638 (1973); Note, In Loco
Parentis and Due Process: Should These Doctrines Apply to Corporal Punishment?, 26
BAYLOR L. REV. 678 (1974).
27. Mawdsley, supra note 26, at 638. See generally Baker v. Downey City Bd. of
Educ., 307 F. Supp. 517 (C.D. Cal. 1969); Patterson v. Nutter, 7 A. 273 (Me. 1886);
Richardson v. Braham, 249 N.W. 557 (Neb. 1933).
28. Guerrieri v. Tyson, 24 A.2d 468 (Pa. 1942):
Under the delegated parental authority implied from the relationship of teacher
and pupil, a teacher may inflict reasonable corporal punishment on a pupil to
enforce discipline [citation omitted] but there is no implied delegation of authority
to exercise her lay judgment, as a parent may, in the matter of the treatment
of injury or disease suffered by a pupil.
Id. at 469.
See generally Bunger v. Iowa High School Athletic Ass'n, 197 N.W.2d 555 (Iowa
1972); Gaincott v. Davis, 275 N.W. 229 (Mich. 1937); E. BOLMEIER, supra note 25, at 12-14.
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Until 1969, the doctrine had never been applied to matters of criminal
import.29 Nelson and Jackson ignored the doctrine's original limitations
and applied in loco parentis in a manner not recognized in common
law.30
Using the in loco parentis doctrine as a basis for student searches
disregards the history of the doctrine and is in direct conflict with its
underlying theory. To stand "in the place of a parent"3 1 implies that
one is to look after the child's best interest in the same manner as a
parent. It is unlikely that most parents would believe it to be in the
best interest of the child to search him for drugs to use against him in
a criminal trial.3 2 Most parents probably do not believe that a criminal
conviction or determination of delinquency benefits a child and would
rather seek other remedies. Additionally, it cannot be assumed that a
parent would voluntarily provide the police with drugs obtained from
their children.3 3 Actually, the converse is true: most parents would
probably elect not to turn their children in. But the facts in Nelson
suggest that school officials may not feel so constrained.84 This is a
patent example of the inappropriateness of in loco parentis as applied
in student search cases. The ultimate irony, of course, is that the
Nelson court chose to apply the doctrine to this particular defendant,
who at age eighteen had attained majority 5
29. In re Donaldson, 75 Cal. Rptr. 220 (Ct. App. 1969).
30. See also Note, In Loco Parentis: Definition, Application, and Implication, 23
S.C. L. REv. 114 (1971).
31. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 896 (4th ed. 1968).
32. The state argued in Gault that the parens patriae doctrine justified its differential
treatment of juveniles. Simply stated, parens patriae means the state is acting in loco
parentis to the juvenile. Nelson presents the same argument, only with reference to a
state official instead of the state. The Supreme Court countered the argument by noting
that the doctrine ultimately confronts the reality of a boy "committed to an institution
where he may be restrained of liberty for years." In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1, 27 (1966).
33. "One of the things that makes in loco parentis such an erroneous phrase in this
context is precisely the absence of a genuinely parental protective concern for the
student who is threatened with the school's power." Buss, The Fourth Amendment and
Searches of Students in Public Schools, 59 IowA L. REv. 739, 768 (1974). See generally
F. ALLEN, TiE BORDERLAND OF CRIMINAL JUSTICE 16-18 (1964); E. BOLMEIER, supra note 25,
at 29-35 (1976); S. DAvIs, RIGHTS OF JUVENILES 63 (1974).
34. See 319 So. 2d at 155.
35. Most secondary school students are under eighteen and therefore subject to trial
as juveniles. FLA. STAT. § 39.02(1) (1975). The analysis employed in this comment is
applicable to juvenile trials as well as adult trials like that experienced by defendant
Nelson. In a case not dealing with search and seizure, the Fifth Circuit has held the
fourth amendment applicable to juvenile courts. Moss v. Weaver, 525 F.2d 1258 (5th
Cir. 1976). With regard to Florida rules governing juvenile courts, see generally FLA. R.
Juv. P. 8.180(a) ("In all cases involving delinquency and/or child in need of supervision,
the Florida Rules of Criminal Procedure shall apply when not in conflict with these
rules.") and FLA. R. CuM. P,. 3.190(h) (governing motions to suppress).
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A proper analysis of search and seizure questions in the context
of the school environment must first determine the status of school
officials. In holding that a school board violated students' first amend-
ment rights, the Supreme Court has stated: "The Fourteenth Amend-
ment . . . protects the citizen against the State itself and all of its
creatures-Boards of Education not excepted. ' 3 6 As employees of the
board of education5 7 school officials are state agentsu The fourth
amendment applies to state agents who conduct searches, regardless
of the purpose of the search 9 Therefore it is not necessary to con-
clude that school officials are law enforcement officers in order to apply
the fourth amendment. 40 It is sufficient to show that they are state
employees acting within the scope of their employment.
The next step is a determination of those factors which define
the reasonableness of the search. As a general rule, a search may be
conducted only on a showing of probable cause, 41 and with certain
exceptions, a warrant for the search must be obtained from an impartial
magistrate There must be compelling reasons for an exception to the
warrant requirement, 3 and the state has the burden of proving that
such compelling reasons exist. 4
36. West Va. State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 637 (1943). See Donoghoe,
Emerging First and Fourth Amendment Rights of the Student, 1 J.L. & EDuc. 449, 450
(1972).
37. FLA. STAT. § 230.23(5) (1975).
38. But see note 13 supra.
39. See, e.g., Camara v. Municipal Ct., 387 U.S. 523 (1967). Camara stands for the
broad proposition that the fourth amendment applies to all searches, even those where
criminal evidence is not being sought. But, "none of the student search cases has
cited Camara." Buss, supra note 33, at 756. See also Greenberg, The Balance of Interests
Theory and the Fourth Amendment: A Selective Analysis of Supreme Court Action Since
Camara and See, 61 CAL. L. REV. 1011 (1973).
40. But one writer has commented that "school authorities often act in concert
with local police and are, in effect, police agents." Note, Balancing ln Loco Parentis
and the Constitution: Defining the Limits of Authority Over Florida's Public High
School Students, 26 U. FLA. L. REV. 271, 286 n.130 (1974). In one case the student
refused to allow the school official to search his pockets. The school official called in a
police officer and, in the officer's presence, searched the student. The school official
found some marijuana and turned it over to the officer. In re Fred C. 102 Cal. Rptr. 682
(1972). See also Comment, Searches by School Oflicials: The Diminishing Fourth Amend-
ment, 14 SANTA CLARA LAWYER 118 (1973).
41. Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443 (1971); Katz v. United States, 389
U.S. 347 (1967); Buss, supra note 33. See note 8 supra.
42. Johnson v. United States, 333 U.S. 10, 13-14 (1948).
43. McDonald v. United States, 335 U.S. 451, 454 (1948) ("Where . . . officers
are not responding to an emergency, there must be compelling reasons to justify the
absence of a search warrant.").
44. See, e.g., Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443, 455 (1971) ("We cannot ...
excuse the absence of a search warrant without a showing by those who seek exemp-
tion . . . that the exigencies of the situation made that course imperative.'); United
States v. Jeffers, 342 U.S. 48, 51 (1951) ("[T]he burden is on those seeking the exemp-
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In school search cases, the courts, though conceding the ordinarily
stringent limitations on search and seizure procedures, have been
notably reluctant to "engraft these very same procedures onto our
school system."45 This is even more remarkable in light of their clear
recognition that exceptions to the warrant requirement have been
"jealously and carefully drawn. ' ' 4 6 The effect has been to carve out
yet another exception-unsanctioned to date by the U.S. Supreme
Court. Justification is found both in the nature of school discipline, 47
and in the increasing problems of crime and drug abuse in the
schools.-
Although certain exceptions have been made for administrative
searches within tightly defined statutory limitations, 49 the school en-
vironment is not clearly analogous. It takes a great leap of the imagina-
tion to conclude that students, upon entering the school grounds,
voluntarily relinquish their privacy in a manner similar to a state or
federally licensed firearms dealer. 50 Furthermore, one looks in vain
for statutory limitations on school officials comparable to those limit-
ing administrative inspection under, for example, the Federal Gun
Control Act.51
Even assuming arguendo that certain relaxed standards may be
justified in the interest of maintaining school discipline, it does not
tion to show the need for it. ); McDonald v. United States, 335 U.S. 451, 456
(1948).
In Florida, the State has the burden of proving the reasonableness of a warrantless
search. Mann v. State, 292 So. 2d 432 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1974). See also State v.
Hinton, 305 So. 2d 804 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1975); State v. Lyons, 293 So. 2d 391
(Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1974); Bicking v. State, 293 So. 2d 385 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1974);
Ashby v. State, 228 So. 2d 400, 407 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1969).
45. Doe v. State, 540 P.2d 827. 832 (N.M. Ct. App. 1975).
46. Id.
47. State v. McKinnon, 558 P.2d 781, 784 (Wash. 1977) (en banc, three justices
dissenting).
48. Doe v. State, 540 P.2d 827 (N.M. Ct. App. 1975); People v. Jackson, 319 N.Y.S.2d
731, 736 (App. Term 1971).
49. United States v. Biswell, 406 U.S. 311 (1972) (firearm business); Colonnade
Catering Corp. v. United States, 397 U.S. 72 (1970) (liquor business). Businesses are
on notice that they are subject to periodic inspection when they enter a regulated
field. To insure that businessmen have adequate notice, the inspections may not proceed
beyond their specific statutory authorization. 406 U.S. at 317.
The Supreme Court of Florida has strictly confined business inspections to their
statutory authorization. Specifically, the court held that the authority to inspect
pharmacies could not be extended to search for drugs proscribed by another statute.
However, the court stated that the legislature could extend the power of warrantless
search to aid in state criminal prosecution by amending the statute which regulates
pharmacies. Olson v. State, 287 So. 2d 313 (Fla. 1973).
50. See, e.g., United States v. Biswell, 406 U.S. 311-15 (1972).
51. 18 U.S.C. 923 (g) (1970).
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follow that evidence procured thereby should be admissible in a
criminal proceeding.5 2 If school officials are to act as agents of the state,
then they should be held to the same standards as the state in pursuing
the ends of criminal justice. 53
The second argument, that "rampant crime and drug abuse"
constitute exigent circumstances sufficient to lower the warrant require-
ment, also misses the point. Exigent circumstances in the criminal
setting never suffice for the wholesale abandonment of fourth amend-
ment requirements. Exigent circumstances, rather, must be evaluated
with respect to a particular person, time, and situation.54
Should, however, the school setting be found appropriate for an
exception to the warrant requirement, it does not follow that a search
and seizure standard lower than probable cause is also appropriate.
The three recognized exceptions to the warrant requirement-to
insure compliance with a licensing regulation; 55 to protect the national
boundaries;5 and to protect a law officer or others from immediate
harm57-are inapposite here. And the court, in this writer's opinion,
has failed markedly to make a case for a new exception under these
circumstances. Most ironically, the facts show that no such straining
for a lower standard-the "reasonable suspicion" standard-was
necessary. In Florida, the smell of marijuana smoke is sufficient probable
cause for a search by a police officer.58
The Nelson decision applies a new standard in determining the
reasonableness of school officials' searches without thoroughly evaluat-
ing whether any departure from the ordinary fourth amendment
standard is necessary or constitutionally permissible. Basing its de-
52. See generally State v. McKinnon, 558 P.2d 781, 789 (Wash. 1977) (Rosellini, J.,
dissenting).
53. See Mercer v. State, 450 S.W.2d 715, 720-22 (Tex. Ct. App. 1970) (Hughes, J.,
dissenting).
54. Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 21 (1968); Sibron v. N.Y., 392 U.S. 40, 64 (1968);
State v. Brooks, 281 So. 2d 55, 56 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1973).
55. See note 49 supra.
56. The Supreme Court in Almeida-Sanchez v. United States, 413 U.S. 266 (1972),
used dicta from Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S. 132 (1924), to support the argument
that border searches are distinguishable from interior searches. Id. at 269. Chief Justice
Taft, in Carroll, explained at great length the statutory history of customs searches.
267 U.S. at 150-53.
57. The Court stated that there are times when a police officer may have reason
to fear for his safety without having the requisite probable cause to conduct a search,
Therefore, the Court allowed a "limited search of outer clothing for weapons." Terry
v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 24-25 (1968); see Cady v. Dombrowski, 413 U.S. 433 (1973).
58. See State v. Boyle, 326 So. 2d 225 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1976); Berry v.
State, 316 So. 2d 72 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1975). Both cases held that the smell
of marijuana smoke emanating from an automobile was sufficient probable cause
for a police officer to search the car and its occupants.
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cision upon an ancient doctrine, which in common law was not applied
to criminal matters, the court did not undertake the evaluation
necessary to determine the reasonableness of the search.
Education is fundamental to a democratic society, but it becomes
vacuous if those being educated are also denied their rights. An
appreciation of basic civil rights can only be learned in an environ-
ment where such rights are rigorously protected. In the words of
Justice Jackson:
That [Boards of Education] are educating the young for citizenship
is reason for scrupulous protection of Constitutional freedoms of
the individual, if we are not to strangle the free mind at its source
and teach youth to discount important principles of our government
as mere platitudes.59
RANDALL O. REDER
Wills and TrustS-TRUST INSTRUMENT PROVIDING FOR PAYMENT OF
ESTATE TAXES IS INSUFFICIENT To AVOID APPLICATION OF FLORIDA
APPORTIONMENT STATUTE, ABSENT ExPREss PROVISION IN TESTATOR'S
WILL-Guidry v. Pinellas Central Bank and Trust Co., 310 So. 2d 386
(Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1975).
On May 4, 1972, Henrik Ovesen created a revocable inter vivos
trust naming Pinellas Central Bank and Trust Company [hereinafter
Pinellas Bank] as trustee.' Reserving the income to himself for life,
Ovesen directed that his wife, Emilie, was to receive the income at his
death. After the death of Ovesen and his wife, the trustee was to set
up two trusts. From the first, Ovesen's daughter, Emilie Erslev, was
to receive income for life, remainder to Mellon National Bank and
Trust Company [hereinafter Mellon Bank] as trustee for a family
foundation. 2 From the second, his granddaughter, Patricia Guidry,
was to receive income for life. Upon her death both income and
principal were to be distributed for her children's educational needs,
if any.3 The excess was also to be distributed to the Mellon Bank for
the family foundation.
59. West Va. State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 637 (1943), quoted in
Buss, supra note 33, at 792.
1. Guidry v. Pinellas Central Bank and Trust Co., 310 So. 2d 386, 387 (Fla. 2d
Dist. Ct. App. 1975).
2. Id.
3. Id. The trust provided that the trustee was "authorized to distribute income and
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